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The precautionary principle, presented as a guide to environmental policy 
decisions in the presence of uncertainty, has been the subject of vigorous debate. 
However,  the  has  generally  not  been  discussed  in  relation  to  formal  theories  of 
choice under uncertainty developed as generalizations of the expected utility model. 
In this paper, it is argued that a formal basis for the precautionary principle may be 
found in an incompleteness hypothesis regarding formal models of choice under 
uncertainty.  The  incompleteness  hypothesis  states  that  estimates  derived  from 
formal models of choice under uncertainty will generally be over-optimistic and that 
the errors will be greater, the less well-understood is the problem in question. 
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The precautionary principle in environmental policy and the 
theory of choice under uncertainty 
Introduction 
The concept of the 'precautionary principle’ has been the subject of vigorous 
debate. As with other contested concepts in environmental theory and policy, most 
notably that of ‘sustainability’, the debate has proceeded in the absence of an agreed 
definition. As a starting point, it is useful to consider the definition implicit in this 
statement  by  Christine  Todd  Whitman,  then  governor  of  New  Jersey  and  later 
Administrator  of  the  United  States  Environmental  Protection  Agency,  quoted  in 
Appell (2001): 
Policymakers  need  to  take  a  precautionary  approach  to 
environmental  protection....  We  must  acknowledge  that 
uncertainty is inherent in managing natural resources, recognize 
it  is  usually  easier  to  prevent  environmental  damage  than  to 
repair it later, and shift the burden of proof away from those 
advocating  protection  toward  those  proposing  an  action  that 
may be harmful. 
As  Whitman  indicates,  the  precautionary  principle  is  concerned  with  the 
formulation  of  choices  under  uncertainty.  However,  in  the  discussion  of  the 
precautionary principle, there has been only occasional reference to the literature on 
the  theory  of  choice  under  uncertainty,  a  literature  that  spans  economics, 
psychology and statistical decision theory. The absence of any formal framework for 
discussion has contributed to the confused nature of the debate, in which a multitude 
of definitions of the precautionary principle have been proposed and criticized. 
Where formal models of choice under uncertainty have been used, it has 
often been observed that the use of theories that are more general than those in 
common use would imply the adoption of some form of precautionary principle.  
For  example,  Kinzig,  Starrett  et  al   (2002)  propose  the  use  of  Bayesian  decision  
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theory  in  place  of  the  classical  inference  model  more  commonly  used  in  the 
assessment of statistical claims about health and other risks.   Gollier, Jullien and 
Treich (2000) and Gollier and Treich (2003) consider the role of option value and 
irreversibility, as do Heal and Kristrom (2002).  Bargiacchi (2003) considers the role 
of generalizations of expected utility theory, such as rank-dependent utility (Quiggin 
1982), that allow for  probability weighting. 
The disparate nature of the issues considered by these authors suggests the 
need for a broader approach to the precautionary principle. In particular, it appears 
desirable to consider the issues in terms of characteristics of choice problems that can 
be described in general terms, rather than as parametric properties of particular 
models such as expected utility. This is the aim of the present paper. 
The crucial idea is the ‘incompleteness hypothesis’ which states that, because 
formal  choice  models  necessarily  omit  some  aspects  of  decision  problems  from 
consideration, their use in poorly-understood problems will introduce a bias in favor 
of overly optimistic decisions. The incompleteness hypothesis implies support for 
the  precautionary  principle,  considered  as  a  procedural  constraint  on  decision-
making, rather than as a decision rule. 
The  paper  is  organised  as  follows.    Section  1  contains  some  background 
information  on  the  precautionary  principle,  though  this  does  not  amount  to  a 
survey  of  the  voluminous  literature  on  the  topic.    Section  2  presents  the 
incompleteness  hypothesis,  which  asserts  that,  because  any  particular  model  of 
decision under uncertainty inevitably omits some relevant factors, estimates derived 
from such a model will generally be over-optimistic. The errors will be greater, the 
less well-understood is the problem in question.  This point is illustrated in relation 
to a sequence of models of decision under uncertainty, each more general than its 
predecessor.  The  core  of  the  paper  is  Section  3,  where  a  general  form  of  the 
incompleteness hypothesis is shown to imply the desirability of using a version of  
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the precautionary principle in decision-making. In Section 4, the implications of the 
analysis  are  discussed,  with  specific  reference  to  climate  change  and  policies  to 
mitigate it. Finally, some concluding comments are presented. 
1. Background 
The  literature  on  the  precautionary  principle  is  too  large  to  permit  the 
presentation  of  an  adequate  survey.  VanderZwaag  (1999)  identifies  fourteen 
different definitions of the principle.  Despite the inevitable vagueness that results 
from discussing imprecisely defined concepts, some observations can be made.  
The simplest applications of the precautionary principle have arisen in cases 
where a new activity is proposed, and concerns are raised that it may involve risks 
to  the  environment  or  to  human  health.      Two  of  the  most  commonly-cited 
examples are the production and marketing of genetically modified foods and the 
exposure  of  the  public  to  various  kinds  of  electromagnetic  fields,  such  as  radio 
frequency fields. 
In  both  examples,  the  low-risk  course  of  action  indicated  by  the 
precautionary  principle  is  easily  identified,  namely  to  restrict  exposure  to  the 
potential hazard in question. In other cases, the balance of risk is less clear. For 
example,  application  of  the  precautionary  principle  to  constrain  the  growth  of 
nuclear power might lead to an expansion of coal-fired electricity generation. Both 
options have potential adverse consequences that are poorly understood. 
Debates  over  the  precautionary  principle  have  typically  involved  an 
interaction  between  scientific  and  legal  standards  of  proof.  Various  standards  of 
proof are considered in legal discussion, including proof beyond reasonable doubt, 
the balance of probabilities, and reasonable grounds for belief. Of these, only the 
balance  of  probabilities  has  a  generally-accepted  meaning  in  terms  of  formal 
decision theory.   
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In legal discussion, the standard of proof is often less important than the 
burden of proof. Advocates of a precautionary principle argue that those proposing 
an innovation should have the burden of proving it to be safe. By contrast, unless 
regulation  is  based,  explicitly  or  implicitly,  on  a  precautionary  principle,  the 
presumption in a liberal social order is that individuals (including corporations and 
other bodies endowed with some form of legal personality) should be free to pursue 
whatever activities they wish in the absence of evidence sufficient to show that such 
activities represent a danger to others. The burden of proof therefore falls on those 
seeking to show that constraints should be imposed.  
Scientific notions of proof are also crucial. Definitions of the precautionary 
principle  often  refer  to  the  need  for  decisions  to  be  taken  in  the  absence  of 
conclusive prove. For example, Appell (2001) cites the following definition from the 
Wingspread conference, held in Racine, Wisconsin in 1998:  
When an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the 
environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if 
some  cause  and  effect  relationships  are  not  fully  established 
scientifically.  
The introduction of notions of scientific proof raises further difficulties. As 
Kinzig  et  al.  (2002)  note,  scientists  are  normally  cautious  about  claiming  that 
particular  propositions  have  been  ‘proved’  or  ‘established’.  The  same  caution  is 
exhibited  by  the  principles  of  classical  statistical  inference,  in  which  the  null 
hypothesis of no correlation between variables is rejected only in the presence of 
evidence sufficient to yield a confidence level of 95 or 90 per cent.
1 Indeed, these 
                                                 
1  The  apparent  conservatism  of  this  approach  is,  to  some  extent,  illusory.  Formal  or 
informal  application  of  search  procedures,  popularly  referred  to  as  ‘data  mining’,  can  induce 
rejection of the null hypothesis with a probability well above the stated significance level of 5 or 
10 per cent, even when the data set is generated by random variables with no correlation. 
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procedures  may  be  seen  as  a  kind  of  precautionary  principle,  based  on  the 
presumption that it is worse to claim proof for a false statement (a Type 1 error in 
the terminology of classical inference) than to fail to claim proof for a true statement 
(a Type 2 error). 
However, the cautious approach of classical inference is justifiable only when 
failure to reject the null hypothesis is, in some relevant sense, the ‘safe’ option. In a 
situation where it is necessary to choose some action, whether a given hypothesis is 
accepted or rejected, there is no general reason to suppose that it is safer to act on 
the basis of the assumption that the null hypothesis is true. 
2. The incompleteness hypothesis and decision theory 
The  precautionary  principle  is  best  considered  in  relation  to  the  standard 
prescription of normative theories of choice under uncertainty, namely, to choose 
the course of action that yields the highest expected (net) benefits. In this context, it 
is  useful  to  begin  by  considering  a  claim  that  will  be  referred  to  as  the 
incompleteness hypothesis. 
In  relation  to  any  particular  model  of  choice  under  uncertainty  the 
incompleteness  hypothesis  asserts  that,  because  the  model  fails  to  capture  all 
relevant aspects of the problem, it will yield inaccurate estimates of the expected 
benefits of any given course of action. Further, the incompleteness hypothesis states 
that estimates will generally be over-optimistic and that the errors will be greater, 
the  less  well-understood  is  the  problem  in  question.    Implicitly  or  explicitly,  the 
incompleteness hypothesis relies on the existence of an encompassing model, more 
complete than that under consideration, that would yield more accurate estimates 
than the model in use. 
As will be discussed in more detail below, acceptance of the incompleteness 
hypothesis  with  respect  to  any  given  model  of  choice  under  uncertainty  implies  
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some form of precautionary principle in relation to decisions made using that model. 
It  follows  from  the  incompleteness  hypothesis  that  the  standard  prescription  of 
choosing the action that yields the highest expected benefits  will lead to a bias in 
favor of choosing courses of action that are poorly understood. The need to correct 
this bias leads to the precautionary principle. 
A number of examples of the incompleteness hypothesis will be considered. 
The examples take the form of a sequence of models, each more general than its 
predecessor, and each introducing new aspects of uncertainty. At each stage, the 
precautionary  hypothesis  holds  true  in  general.  From  the  viewpoint  of  the 
encompassing model, the predecessor model is a special case incorporating a bias 
towards over-optimism. 
The best-projection approach and the expected value approach 
The simplest, and still one of the most commonly used, method of evaluating 
a  proposed  course  of  action  involving  uncertain  outcomes  is  to  choose  some 
particular projection of future uncertain events, including estimates of the values of 
unknown parameters, and to select the course of action that would yield the best 
outcome  under  that  projection.  This  will  be  referred  to  as  the  best-projection 
approach. A closely related approach is that of the surprise-free projection (Kahn 
1965). 
The  best-projection  approach  may  be  compared  with  more  general 
approaches  to  benefit–cost  analysis  under  uncertainty,  in  which  a  number  of 
different  possibilities  are  taken  into  account.  The  simplest  such  approach  is 
sensitivity analysis, in which the consequences of varying individual parameters are 
assessed.  A  more  general  and  systematic  approach  is  expected-value  analysis,  in 
which a joint probability distribution over relevant parameters is used to calculate an 
expected  value,  expressed  in  monetary  terms.  Considered  in  the  light  of  the  
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expected  value  approach,  two  problems  with  the  best-projection  approach  are 
relevant in consideration of the precautionary hypothesis.  
First,  it  is  common  to  use  modal  estimates  for  parameter  values,  and  to 
combine  them  in  a  linear  fashion.  If  probability  distributions  are  skewed,  or  if 
variables are related in a nonlinear fashion, this will produce biased estimates. More 
commonly than not, skewness is usually associated with a long tail of unfavorable 
events and nonlinearity with undesirable interactions between variables.  
One way of addressing the problem is to distinguish between ‘pure’ risk 
(variation about a  central value) and ‘downside’ risk (the risk that a variable of 
interest may fall below the desired value). The problem of downside risk is discussed 
by Quiggin (2004). 
The second problem is that of option value (Arrow and Fisher 1974; Henry 
1974). In a situation of uncertainty, the best response will typically depend on the 
value of uncertain parameters. Hence, other things being equal, it is better to wait 
until uncertainty is resolved before making a decision, rather than implementing the 
decision  that  would  yield  the  best  expected  outcome  on  the  basis  of  available 
incomplete  information.  Thus,  an  action  that  does  not  foreclose  future  options 
should be preferred to one that is irreversible. The benefit from waiting is analogous 
to that of holding a financial option, and is referred to as ‘option value’. 
This point is developed in more detail by Gollier, Jullien and Treich (2000) 
and Heal and Kristrom (2002). In particular, consider a situation where a severe 
outcome  might  arise  from  a  low-probability  event  or  from  the  interaction  of  a 
number of adverse events.  Use of the best-projection approach would normally 
lead  to  the  exclusion  of  such  events  from  consideration,  and  therefore  to  the 
adoption of an overly optimistic decision. By contrast, an expected value approach 
would take such events into consideration. 
The  problems  with  the  best-projection  approach  have  led  to  significantly  
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overoptimistic  estimates  in  many  cases.  The  troubled  history  of  ex  ante  project 
evaluation provides ample confirmation of the proposition that a best-projection 
approach  will  typically  lead  to  overestimates  of  the  returns  from  an  investment 
project. A good recent summary of the evidence is given by Flyvberg, Bruzeliu, and 
Rothengatter (2003). 
The expected value approach and the expected utility approach 
As discussed in the previous section, the expected value approach involves 
consideration of the distribution of possible outcomes from any given course of 
action, and the selection of the action that yields the best mean outcome. Outcome 
values are typically expressed in monetary terms. 
Although  the  expected  value  approach  is  widely  used  in  the  analysis  of 
choices involving uncertainty, the framework favored by most economists for the 
analysis of such choices is that of expected utility theory. The expected value model 
is the special case of the expected utility model when utility is a linear function of 
wealth. 
In the application of expected utility theory, it is normally assumed that the 
utility  function  is  concave.  This  assumption  is  normally  characterized  as  risk 
aversion,  since  it  has  the  behavioral  implication  that  any  monetary  outcome, 
received  with  certainty,  is  preferred  to  a  risky  prospect  with  the  same  expected 
value. As will be shown below, in general models of choice under uncertainty, risk 
averse  behavior  may  arise  from  many  different  sources.  In  the  expected  utility 
model, risk aversion arises from the diminishing marginal utility of money (income, 
consumption or wealth).
2 
Considered  in  the  light  of  expected  utility  theory,  the  expected  value 
                                                 
2 This way of expressing things relates to cardinal utility: a restatement in purely ordinalist terms 
might refer to the fact that the rate of substitution between income in states of nature A and B 
diminishes as income in state A increases.    .  
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approach is biased in favor of risky or uncertain options. As has been noted, risk 
aversion implies that any monetary outcome, received with certainty, is preferred to 
a risky prospect with the same expected value. More generally, of two distributions 
yielding the same expected value, the less risky
3 is to be preferred. By continuity, a 
certain outcome will be preferred to a risky prospect with a slightly higher expected 
value. 
Hence, if a number of projects are being compared, use of the expected value 
approach will lead to a bias in favor of a more risky approach. This is true even in 
the presence of ad hoc corrections such as the use of a discount rate that is higher 
than the real bond rate. Such corrections penalize long-term projects but do not 
correct appropriately for a bias in favor of risky projects, unless relative risk grows 
linearly over time (Little and Mirrlees 1974). 
This problem has become evident in the literature on sustainable growth. 
Consider a problem where there is some probability that a given growth path will 
prove unsustainable, yielding substantial reductions in income in the distant future. 
The  use  of  an  expected  value  approach  will  place  inadequate  weight  on  this 
outcome.  Raising  the  discount  rate  to  ‘adjust’  for  risk  will  only  exacerbate  the 
problem.  Under  these  circumstances,  the  discount  rate  is  dominated  by  adverse 
outcomes,  in  the  sense  that  much  of  the  value  of  future  consumption  will  arise 
where that consumption is available in states of nature where consumption is lower 
than at present. It follows that the distant future should be discounted at significantly 
lower rates than suggested by the current market discount rate (Newell and Pizer 
2003). 
                                                 
3 In the context of expected utility theory, the most natural concept of ‘less risky’ is that 
derived from the work of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970).  See also Quiggin (1991). 
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The expected utility approach and the rank-dependent utility approach 
After  subsuming  and  displacing  mean-variance  analysis  in  the  1960s, 
expected utility theory was the only framework used in economic analysis, to any 
significant  extent,  for  several  decades.  However,  the  accuracy  of  expected  utility 
theory,  considered  as  a  descriptive  model  of  individual  preferences  came  under 
increasing criticism during the 1970s, culminating in the critique of Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979). This criticism also renewed interest in the much earlier critique put 
forward by Allais (1953). 
Allais had argued that the utility function was best understood in cardinal 
terms and that individuals might not choose to maximize expected utility, but might 
be concerned also with the variance of utility about its expected value. Defenders of 
the expected utility approach claimed that Allais had misunderstood the argument, 
and that risk aversion was entirely captured by the curvature of the utility function.  
Disputes  of  this  general  form  have  been  a  recurring  feature  of  the 
development of the theory of choice under uncertainty. Advocates of more general 
models  have  argued  that  existing  models  fail  to  capture  important  aspects  of 
attitudes to risk and, in particular, of risk aversion.  Supporters of the existing model 
argue that, to the extent they capture real phenomena, the supposedly new aspects 
of risk aversion are encompassed by the existing concepts. 
The  critiques  of  the  1970s  led  to  the  development  of  a  wide  range  of 
alternatives to, and generalizations of, expected utility theory. Of these, the most 
significant  and  widely-used  have  been  prospect  theory  (Kahneman  and  Tversky 
1979)  and  rank-dependent  utility  models  (Quiggin  1981,  1982;  Segal  1987;  
Schmeidler  1989).  The  two  approaches  have  been  combined  to  yield  cumulative 
prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1990). 
The central insight underlying rank-dependent approaches, going back to 
Allais  (1953),  is  that  risk  attitudes  may  depend  on  the  probability  with  which  
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particular utility levels are realized and, more generally, on the entire probability 
distribution over utility levels, and not merely on the expectation of utility. Quiggin 
(1981,  1982)  showed  how  this  idea  could  be  formalized  using  a  rank-dependent 
transformation  of  the  probability  distribution.  Schmeidler  (1989)  developed  the 
same idea in the state–act framework due to  Savage (1954), where probabilities are 
derived from preferences rather than being objectively given. 
Quiggin (1981, 1982) argued for an ‘S-shaped’ probability distribution, which 
increased the weight on both the worst and the best outcomes in a symmetrical 
fashion.  Other  writers  have  examined  the  case  of  a  concave  transformation, 
embodying a concept of ‘pessimism’, in which lower-ranked outcomes are always 
given higher weight relative to their objective probabilities. Most empirical studies 
support a transformation that is S-shaped, but which is pessimistic over most of its 
range. 
Bargiacci  (2003)  examines  the  relationship  between  rank-dependent  utility 
and the precautionary principle, with specific application to climate change. With 
pessimistic  preferences,  the  evaluation  of  risky  outcomes  is  less  favorable  than 
under  expected  utility  with  the  same  utility  function.  With  an  S-shaped 
transformation function, impacts are ambiguous, though the general tendency is for 
less favorable evaluation of risky outcomes. 
For random variables with moderate variance and symmetric distributions 
(such as normal distributions) the extension from expected utility to rank-dependent 
expected  utility  is  unlikely  to  make  much  difference,  even  in  the  presence  of 
systematic pessimism. This is because, if the risk preferences of a rank-dependent 
expected-utility maximizer are elicited under the incorrect assumption of expected-
utility preferences, pessimism in the probability transformation will be reflected in 
additional concavity in the elicited utility function. 
The importance of rank-dependent preferences is likely to be greatest when  
14 
some choices yield distributions of outcomes that are skewed to the right (have a 
long left tail), so that there is a small probability of a severe adverse outcome. Given 
the  existence  of  adverse  low-probability  events,  rank-dependent  expected-utility 
preferences  displaying  overweighting  of  extreme  probabilities  will  yield  more 
negative  evaluations  of  the  ‘business  as  usual’  strategy  than  will  expected-utility 
preferences with the same utility function, even though on average, the two sets of 
preferences are about equally risk-averse. 
 Risk and ambiguity 
In all of the models considered thus far, it has been assumed that, for any 
action under consideration, there exists a well-defined probability distribution over 
consequences. The usual way of formulating this assumption is the Savage (1954) 
framework in which acts are considered as a mapping from a space of states of 
nature  to  a  space  of  outcomes.  If  preferences  over  actions  display  appropriate 
consistency properties, they are described as probabilistically sophisticated (Machina 
and Schmeidler 1992). That is, there exists a probability distribution over the state 
space with respect to which preferences respect first-order stochastic dominance.  
Both expected-utility and rank-dependent expected-utility preferences, as well as a 
large class of generalized expected-utility models, display probabilistic sophistication. 
The  assumption  of  probabilistic  sophistication  works  well  in  decision 
problems where probabilities can be inferred from objective information, such as 
previous observations of the frequency of particular outcomes or knowledge about 
the  physical  characteristics  of,  say,  a  die.  It  may  also  be  extended  to  problems 
involving subjective probabilities where decision-makers have extensive experience 
of  judging  problems  of  a  given  kind,  such  as  the  outcomes  of  horse  races  or 
marketing campaigns. 
However,  when  faced  with  complex  or  unfamiliar  problems,  decision- 
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makers often find probabilistic reasoning unhelpful. Keynes (1920) first formulated 
the objection that for many important decisions there was no basis for determining 
a  reasonable  probability  distribution  for  outcomes.  Experiments  conducted  by 
Ellsberg (1961) showed that in such situations, people preferred bets with known 
odds  to  either  side  of  a  bet  in  which  there  was  no  easy  way  to  formulate 
probabilities. The latter situation is described as one of ambiguity. 
The most successful approach to the analysis of problems of this kind has 
been  the  multiple-priors  model  of  Gilboa  and  Schmeidler  (1989).  In  this  model, 
decision-makers are assumed to consider a set of possible probability distributions 
over states of nature. If decision-makers are averse to ambiguity, they will evaluate 
actions according to the probability distribution that is least favorable. 
Compared  to  any  assumption  of  fixed  probabilities,  the  multiple-priors 
approach  with  ambiguity  aversion  will  yield  a  lower  evaluation  of  ambiguous 
actions  whenever  the  given  probabilities  lie  within  the  set  of  priors.  The  two 
approaches will coincide if probabilities are unambiguous, that is, if the set of priors 
has a single element. Thus, relative to the fixed probability approach, a multiple-
priors  approach  will  be  less  favorable  to  decisions  involving  high  levels  of 
uncertainty. 
State spaces and proposition spaces 
Although the multiple-priors model relaxes the unrealistic assumption that 
decision-makers  have  well-defined  subjective  probability  distributions  for  all 
possible  events,  it  still  requires  them  to  hold  unrealistically  precise  beliefs  about 
uncertain events. In particular, decision-makers are expected to be able to describe 
uncertainty in terms of a mutually exclusive and exhaustive set of possible states of 
the  world.    Although  this  is  obviously  implausible,  simple  modifications  to  the 
Savage framework (for example, the inclusion of a residual ‘unspecified’ event) do  
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not appear to yield useful insights into the problem. 
Grant  and  Quiggin  (2004)  adopt  an  alternative  approach.  Beliefs  are 
described in terms of a finite set of propositions, which decision-makers can consider 
as true, false or possible. This finite set is assumed to be a proper subset of the set of 
propositions (assumed countably infinite) needed to characterize all possible states 
of the world. 
The  crucial  contribution  of  this  approach  is  that  it  provides  a  way  of 
describing  how  new  propositions,  previously  not  considered,  may  enter  the 
thinking  of  a  decision  model.  Currently  unconsidered  elements  of  the  set  of  all 
propositions are described as accessible if they have high information value with 
respect  to  the  set  of  propositions  currently  under  consideration  by  the  decision-
maker. 
The  prescriptive  implications  of  the  model  are  less  clear-cut.  Grant  and 
Quiggin suggest that, in the absence of a complete description of the space of states 
of nature, a case-based approach similar to that advocated by Gilboa and Schmeidler  
(1995) may be appropriate. The case-based approach provides a rationale for the use 
of rules of thumb, like the precautionary principle, where these are supported by 
past experience.  
Risk and rationality 
Discussion of alternatives to, and generalizations of, expected utility theory 
have  raised  both  positive  and  normative  issues.  It  is  fairly  widely  agreed  that 
expected  utility  theory  does  not  provide  an  adequate  positive  description  of 
observed  choices  under  uncertainty.  On  the  other  hand,  many  defenders  of  the 
expected utility model argue that its normative appeal as a guide to rational choices 
remains undiminished. 
Supposing that policymakers accept the normative appeal of expected utility  
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theory,  but  recognize  that  people  do  not,  in  general,  act  in  accordance  with  its 
prescriptions,  what  should  they  do?    It  is  commonly  suggested  that,  in  such 
circumstances,  policymakers  should  disregard  ‘irrational’  preferences,  but  this 
suggestion creates two major difficulties. 
First, there are general issues of democratic process. If policymakers think 
that it is appropriate, as a general principle, to follow a rule of maximizing expected 
utility, they should seek to persuade the public of the desirability of this principle, 
rather than imposing it by fiat. 
Second, in the absence of comprehensive central planning, a situation where 
policymakers implement preferences different from the aggregate preferences of 
the public is likely to generate welfare losses. Suppose, for example, that consumers 
place a high weight on the risk of harm from contaminants in water supplies, and 
that policymakers judge that a lower weight is appropriate. If policymakers follow 
this judgement and refraining from implementing improvements in water safety for 
which,  on  their  assessment,  costs  exceed  benefits,  consumers  may  respond  by 
switching to bottled water, incurring higher costs than would have been required to 
implement the improvements. 
For both these reasons, it seems appropriate that, at least where individual 
preferences are consistent and permit aggregation, it seems better to follow these 
preferences in public decision-making, rather than substituting the judgements of 
policymakers.  Hence,  it  seems  likely  that  the  expected  utility  model  will  not,  in 
general, be the most appropriate approach. 
An illustration: the Rasmussen Report 
A  noteworthy  illustration  of  the  problems  in  attempting  a  complete 
probabilistic specification of the state space is the Rasmussen report (US Nuclear 
Regulatory  Commission  1974)  on  nuclear  safety.  Rasmussen  and  his  colleagues  
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attempted  to  estimate  the  probability  of  nuclear  accidents  using  an  event-tree 
analysis, and concluded that the probability of a serious meltdown was minuscule 
(one in 20,000 per reactor per year for a core meltdown) 
The partial meltdown at Three Mile Island, which occurred in 1979, illustrated 
both the strengths and limitations of the event-tree approach. On the one hand, the 
general form of the accident was one that had been considered by Rasmussen. On 
the other hand, the chain of problems, including operator errors that aggravated the 
severity  of  the  accident,  was  not.  This  implies  that  Rasmussen  almost  certainly 
underestimated  the  likelihood  of  more  severe  accidents.  A  study  by  Nordhaus 
(1979),  using  aggregate  empirical  evidence,  rather  than  event-tree  modeling 
concluded that  
Using the technique of maximum  likelihood, our best guess estimate of the 
risk of accidents causing at least one fatality  rises from the Reactor Safety 
Study’s 32 per million reactor years to about 2000 per  million reactor years. 
3. The incompleteness meta-hypothesis and the precautionary principle 
As  noted  above,  in  relation  to  any  particular  model  of  choice  under 
uncertainty the incompleteness hypothesis asserts that, because the model fails to 
capture all relevant aspects of the problem, it will yield inaccurate estimates of the 
expected  benefits  of  any  given  course  of  action.  The  discussion  of  the  previous 
section suggests that the incompleteness hypothesis remains valid as we consider a 
sequence  of  increasingly  general  models,  from  the  simplistic  best-projection 
approach to models incorporating finite knowledge and multiple priors. Thus, we 
may consider encompassing these specific versions of the incompleteness hypothesis 
with a meta-hypothesis. The incompleteness meta-hypothesis states that: 
Estimates  of  project  outcomes  derived  from  formal  models  of  choice  under 
uncertainty  are  inherently  incomplete.  Incomplete  estimates  will  generally  be  over-
optimistic.  The errors will be greater, the less well-understood is the problem in question.   
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The second part of the hypothesis is crucial. If a problem is well understood 
within  a  given  formal  model,  incompleteness  will  not  be  a  serious  issue.  For 
example, casinos can normally rely on expected-value calculations, since the Law of 
Large Numbers ensures that, if a game has a positive expected value for the house, 
it will yield a positive average return over many plays, with probability close to one. 
Similarly, expected utility models appear to work well in the absence of ‘edge effects’ 
(low-probability events with extreme outcomes). 
The  incompleteness  principle  is  a  statement  about  the  evaluation  of 
prospects.  By  contrast,  as  noted  above,  the  precautionary  principle  is  typically 
presented as a guide to action in relation to proposed innovations. To link the two, it 
is necessary to add the auxiliary hypothesis that the consequences of innovations are 
less  well-understood  than  the  consequences  of  maintaining  the  status  quo.  In  a 
situation where the status quo has been sustained for a long period, this hypothesis is 
not problematic. In many cases, however, there is no pre-existing equilibrium, but 
rather a set of ‘business as usual’ practices that may or may not be sustainable and 
for which the consequences of persisting with existing practice may or may not be 
well understood. 
Assuming for the moment that the auxiliary hypothesis of an initial stable 
equilibrium is valid, the incompleteness hypothesis suggests that a formal evaluation 
within an incomplete model is likely to be biased in favor of innovation and against 
the status quo. This in turn implies that some sort of burden of proof should be 
placed on the advocates of innovation.  
On the other hand, the incompleteness principle does not support strong 
versions of the precautionary principle in which the burden of proof is taken to 
mean  ‘proof  beyond  reasonable  doubt’  or  something  similar.  Such  an  approach 
could be supported only by highly pessimistic decision criteria such as maximin, that 
is, maximizing the value of the worst possible outcome. Although maximin decision  
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criteria  have  been  advocated  in  various  contexts,  there  is  little  empirical  or 
theoretical support for the use of such criteria. The only context in which maximin is 
clearly  justified  is  the  case  of  zero-sum  games,  analysed  by  von  Neumann  and 
Morgenstern (1944). In relation to environmental problems, maximin would make 
sense only if ‘Nature’ were viewed as a malevolent opponent. 
The auxiliary hypothesis that the consequences of innovations are less well-
understood  than  the  consequences  of  maintaining  the  status  quo  seems  to  work 
fairly well in the case of techniques associated with genetic engineering. The status 
quo in this case includes both long-standing traditional methods of crop and animal 
breeding,  which  have  produced  plants  and  animals  with  genetic  endowments 
radically  different  from  those  of  their  wild  ancestors,  and  more  recent  technical 
innovations such as artificial insemination and embryo transfer.  
Advocates  of  the  precautionary  principle  has  been  criticized  for  failing  to 
provide a precise operational definition of the principle. The discussion presented 
above suggests that this criticism is misplaced. Any precise definition implies the 
existence of a well-defined formal analytical model within which the principle may 
be  applied.  But  the  incompleteness  hypothesis  states  that  any  such  model  will 
exclude  relevant  factors.  Hence,  the   precautionary  principle  must  necessarily  be 
considered as a heuristic check on formal decision-making procedures rather than as 
a rule to be applied within a given formal framework. 
The standard practices of engineering provide a useful analogy. Particularly 
in critical applications, it is not good engineering practice to compute the optimal 
trade-off between cost and the risk of failure, using a standard model, and then to 
adopt  the  indicated  solution.  Rather  the  standard  approach  is  to  compute  the 
optimal solution, then to allow a substantial safety margin, based on a combination 
of  past  experience  and  rules  of  thumb.  This  may  be  seen  as  an  instance  of  the 
precautionary principle at work.  
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4. The precautionary principle and global warming 
The problem of climate change may be used to illustrate the issues raised by 
the interpretation of the precautionary principle offered here. 
Background 
 The  global  climate  is  determined,  in  large  measure,  by  the  ‘greenhouse 
effect’ of the earth’s atmosphere, which reduces the extent to which heat is radiated 
into  space,  and  thereby  raises  the  global  temperature.  Without  this  greenhouse 
effect, life on earth would not be sustainable. On the other hand, rapid change in the 
magnitude of the effect will induce changes in global climate with generally adverse 
effects.  
The  magnitude  of  the  greenhouse  effect  is  primarily  determined  by  the 
relative  concentrations  of  different  gases  (and  water  vapor)  in  the  atmosphere. 
Human  activity  has  greatly  increased  the  concentration  of  some  gases,  such  as 
carbon dioxide (CO2), that promote the greenhouse effect.  
Although  there  is  general  agreement  on  these  basic  points,  almost  every 
other aspect of the climate change problem is the subject of both disagreement and 
uncertainty.  Most  measures  suggest  that  average  global  temperatures  have 
increased  over  the  past  fifty  years,  and  most  climate  models  suggest  that  this 
increase is due, at least in part, to human activity. The evidence on these points has 
been summarized by the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2001a,b), 
which  has  also  prepared  a  range  of  projections  of  changes  in  global  climate, 
employing alternative models and a range of scenarios generating different time 
paths for emissions of greenhouse gases. 
The  main  focus  is  on  simulations  using  the  Atmosphere-Ocean  General 
Circulation Model (AOGCM), and modeling the change in global average surface air 
temperature, as measured by the difference between the average for the period  
22 
1961–1990 and the average for the period 2021–2050. In these simulations, the mean 
temperature increase is 1.3°C  (IPCC 2001a).  
Such an increase in temperature would damage some vulnerable ecosystems 
such as coral reefs, and might increase risks of flooding and storm damage in coastal 
areas and low-lying countries such as Bangladesh. However, for most countries, the 
effect on human activity would be modest. The IPCC also surveyed a number of 
studies using different climate models, with differing assumptions and over different 
time periods. The increases in average global temperature estimated in these studies 
range from 0.8°C to more than 5°C. 
Responding to projections of climate change, a Climate Convention held in 
Kyoto, Japan, in 1997 agreed to the Kyoto Protocol (United Nations 1997) to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on  Climate Change, originally adopted in 
1992.  Under  the  Protocol,  developed  nations  agreed  that,  by  2012,  they  would 
reduce emissions of greenhouse gases to 1990 levels, subject to a complex set of 
adjustments for individual circumstances.  
The United States and Australian governments subsequently announced that 
they would not ratify the protocol. The only other large country not to ratify the 
Protocol is Russia, where legislation to ratify the treaty is currently (October 2004) 
under consideration by the Duma (Parliament). Ratification by Russia would bring 
the treaty into force. 
Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol would have only a modest effect on 
the rate of global warming, relative to business as usual. Hence, advocates of the 
Protocol normally regard it as a first step, preparatory to a broader agreement that 
would include less-developed countries, and would entail deeper cuts in emissions 
for developed countries. 
A range of computable general equilibrium models have been used to model 
the economic costs and benefits of implementing the Kyoto protocol, with broadly  
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consistent results. As would be expected on the basis of standard partial equilibrium 
analysis,  targets  for  reductions  in  emissions  can  be  achieved  at  a  lower  net  cost 
through  trade  in  emissions  rights  than  through  the  imposition  of  quantitative 
restrictions on particular sources of emissions or source countries.  
Estimates of the net cost of implementing the Kyoto Protocol through an 
emissions trading system range from 0.1 per cent of world product to 1.5 per cent.  
There has been less detailed modeling of the economic effects of policies to achieve 
the ultimate objective of stabilizing global concentrations of greenhouse gases.  Such 
policies would require substantial reductions in the use of fossil fuels, and might be 
expected to lead to a doubling of the unit cost of energy. This would imply a welfare 
loss comparable in magnitude to the share of energy in world product, which is 
around 5 per cent. The adoption of mitigation strategies would yield benefits such as 
reductions  in  losses  of  coastal  land  and  in  biodiversity.  There  is  no  generally 
accepted monetary estimate of the value of these benefits. 
Incompleteness 
The climate change problem illustrates several aspects of the incompleteness 
hypothesis and the precautionary principle. Projections of the likely rate of climate 
change, and of its likely effects are incomplete in several important respects. 
Reliance on a best estimate, such as the IPCC (1999) mean projection of a 
global temperature increase of 1.3°C, as opposed to a range of possible projections, 
could  be  misleading  in  a  number  of  respects.  First,  consideration  of  a  single 
projection may lead to the adoption of excessively inflexible policies for mitigation of 
climate change, without the capacity for adaptation to new information. 
Second, many of the consequences of climate change are related nonlinearly 
to the rate of climate change. Although the consequences of an increase in global 
mean  temperatures  of  1.3°C  over  50  years  would  be  relatively  modest,  the  
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consequences of an increase of 5°C over the same period could have catastrophic 
consequences, particularly if it led to large increases in sea levels.  
Third,  even  if  such  catastrophic  outcomes  have  low  probability,  many 
decision-makers might consider it appropriate to place a high weight on preventing 
them.  Thus,  an  analysis  based  on  expected  costs  and  benefits  would  prove 
inappropriate. 
Finally,  it  is  important  to  consider  the  possibility  of  unforeseen 
developments  that  might  radically  alter  the  projections.  By  definition,  such 
developments  cannot  be  described  in  detail,  but  relevant  possibilities  include 
technological  innovations  (which  might  permit  low-cost  mitigation  in  future)  or 
previously unknown climatic feedbacks (which might either mitigate or exacerbate 
climate change). 
In  summary,  any  formal  approach  to  projecting  climate  change  and  its 
consequences is likely to be subject to the problem of incompleteness. There are also 
problems of incompleteness with respect to estimates of the costs of programs to 
mitigate climate change. However, as shown above, these problems are less severe 
than those of estimating the effects of climate change. 
The precautionary principle 
Before the precautionary principle can be applied, it is necessary to consider 
the nature of the ‘innovation’ under question. The answer to this question largely 
determines the way in which the policy debate is framed. 
From the perspective of fossil fuel users, the introduction of restrictions on 
emissions of greenhouse gases is an innovation. On the other hand, doubling the 
concentration of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases is clearly an innovation 
as far as the global climate is concerned. 
  In this case, the consequences of continuing ‘business as usual’ are less well  
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understood than the consequences of substantial reductions in emissions. Hence, the 
precautionary principle favors the adoption of measures to mitigate the danger of 
global  warming,  even  if  it  is  not  clearly  established  that  the  benefits  of  those 
measures will exceed the costs. 
In this context, the main benefit of measures undertaken to implement the 
Kyoto Protocol is that they provide the basis for a more extensive mitigation policy 
if the information that becomes available over the next decade confirms a relatively 
pessimistic assessment of the outlook for climate change. So, it is important that the 
approach  taken  to  implementation  should  be  consistent  with  the  adoption  of  a 
broader  agreement  including  developing  as  well  as  developed  countries.  In 
particular, it is desirable that mechanisms for global trade in emissions rights be 
developed as part of the implementation process. 
It  is,  of  course,  possible  that  new  information  will  indicate  that  concerns 
about  climate  change  have  been  overstated.  If  so,  resources  devoted  to 
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol will turn out, ex post, to have been wasted. 
But  the  discussion  above  indicates  that,  in  problems  of  this  kind,  unpleasant 
surprises  are  more  common  than  pleasant  ones.  It  will  be  preferable  to  have 
devoted excessive resources to preparing for an outcome that turns out better-than-
expected than to have devoted inadequate resources to preparation for a worse-
than-expected outcome. 
Concluding comments 
Although the precautionary principle has played a prominent role in public 
debate for more than a decade, attempts to state the principle as an operational 
decision rule have produced no broad agreement either on the correct statement of 
the principle or on its validity as a guide to decisions. Disagreement of this kind 
suggests that the discussion is taking place at the wrong level of analysis. It may not  
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be possible to state the precautionary principle as a formal decision rule. That does 
not diminish its importance as a guide to good decisions. 
In  this  paper,  it  has  been  argued  that  the  precautionary  principle  is  best 
understood as a procedural ‘burden of proof’ constraint, requiring that arguments 
for risky innovations be held to a more stringent standard than that they are shown 
to  be  optimal  by  a  (necessarily  incomplete)  decision-theoretic  analysis.  
Incompleteness, and the associated bias towards poorly-understood options affects 
all formal decision procedures, from the commonplace best-projection approach to 
more sophisticated expected-utility analysis. 
Viewed in this light, the precautionary principle provides a useful framework 
for the assessment of a range of policy problems, particularly environmental issues, 
where some components of the problem are well-known and amenable to formal 
analysis,  while  knowledge  about  other  components  of  the  problem  is  uncertain, 
ambiguous and incomplete. The problem of climate change is an ideal example. 
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